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Intra-Industry Reactions of Stock Split Announcements 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper examines whether favorable information conveyed by stock split 
announcements transfers to non-splitti g firms within the same industry.  We find that there exists 
intra-industry reaction; share olders of non-splitting firms experience significant positive abnormal 
returns during the stock split announcement period of their industry counterparts.  In addition, we 
find that industry-wide (level of concentration) and firm-specific characteristics (degree of 
similarity with the splitting firm, level of asymmetric information, and mispricing) are important 
determinants in explaining the impact of the announcements on non-splitting firms.  We further 
document an increase in earnings subsequent to the a nouncements which is associated to the 
stock price reactions.  However, we find little evidence that there is a decline in earnings volatility 
and find no significant relation between change in earnings volatility and announcement period 
returns.  
Intra-Industry Reactions of Stock Split Announcements 
 
1. Introduction 
A substantial amount of research shows that there is an association between equity value 
of firms releasing information and that of non-releasing firms within the same industry.  This 
association, known as intra-industry reaction or information transfer, has been documented in 
different contexts such as bankruptcy announcements (Aharony and Swary (1996), Lang and 
Stulz (1992)), bond rating adjustments (Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997)), divid nd change 
announcements (Firth (1996), Laux, Starks, Yoon (1998)), earnings announcements (Foster 
(1981)), and securities offerings (Szewczyk (1992)).  In this paper, we extend prior studies by 
examining whether stock split announcements affect stock pric s of non-splitting firms in the same 
industry.  
Prior literature documents that the market reacts favorably to the announcements of stock 
splits and presents two major hypotheses to explain the positive stock returns.1 The info mation 
content hypothesis suggests that stock splits reveal favorable information about cash dividend 
and/or unusual earnings increases subsequent to the announcement.2  The tradi g range 
hypothesis argues that firms who experience a run-up in stock prices split their stocks to move the 
firms’ share price into an ‘optimum trading range’ thus improving trading liquidity.3  By 
examining intra-industry reaction to stock split announcements, this study distinguishes between 
these two hypotheses as motivations for stock splits.  Since the tradi g range of non-splitting 
firms’ stocks does not change, abnormal announcement period stock price reactions of these firms 
cannot be attributed to enhanced liquidity but is consistent with the hypothesis that stocks splits 
reveal information about fut re prospects of the industry.   
In addition, stock splits are ideal experimental setting within which to examine the impact 
of factors that affect market's inference about stock prices.  The events that are studied in the 
                                                  
1 See Fama, Fisher, Jensen, Roll (1969), Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), 
Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Brennan and Copeland (1988), McNichols and Dravid (1990), Ikenberry, Rankine, 
and Stice (1996), Pilotte and Manuel (1996), and Desai and Jain (1997). 
2 See Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), McNichols and Dravid (1990) and 
Desai and Jain (1997). 
3 See Baker and Gallagher (1980), Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Maloney and Mulherin (1992), uscarella, and 
Vetsuypens (1996), and Schultz (1999).  A variation of this hypothesis is presented by Angel (1994) who argues 
that firms split their stocks to attain an optimum tick size relative to the share price. 
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existing literature (e.g., dividends and earnings changes, bankruptcy announcements etc.) all have 
direct cash flow implications for the announcing firm or its investors; and possibly for non-
announcers.  Therefore, they convey information about past and current cash flow that was not 
already public, as well as information about the firm’s future prospects.  Stock splits are cosmetic 
accounting changes with no direct impact on the announcer’s future cash flows or that of non-
announcers.  Thus the stock split announcement period reactions for both the announcing and 
non-announcing firms only reflect the market’s inference about the future prospects of these firms 
conveyed by the event. This paper therefore provides a clean experiment to test hypotheses 
relating to industry and firm-specifc factors that affects information transfer about firms’ value 
within an industry. 
In examining intra-industry information transfers most prior studies document a net 
contagion effect at the announcement of a corporate event, i. ., the stock price reaction for other 
firms in the industry moves in the same direction as that of announcing firms.  However, Lang and 
Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and Yoon (1998) argue that in highly concentrated industries 
where competition for market share is high, certain events may trigger a change in the competitive 
balance within the industry.  Thus the announcements of these events will result in stock price 
movements for other firms in the industry in a direction opposite to that of the announcing firm, 
i.e., competitive effect.  In this study we explain the diverse stock price reactions of non-splitting 
firms at the announcements of stock splits.  We find that industry-wide and firm-specific 
characteristics are important determinants of the differential impact of stock split announcements 
on non-splitting firms.   
Using a sample of 327 clean stock split announcements between 1986 to 1995, we find 
that shareholders of non-splitting firms experience a significant increase in stock prices during the 
announcement period.  This significant reaction suggests that there exists an intra-industry 
reaction to stock split announcements supporting the information content hypothesis.  The 
positive abnormal returns of non-splitting firms also indicate that information conveyed by the 
announcements has a net contagion effect on the equity value of non-splitting firms.  The 
contagion effect appears to be influenced by the degree of concentration within an industry.  
Firms in industries with low level of concentration experience significantly higher returns than 
those in industries with high level of concentration. 
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We also find that firm-specific characteristics explain the differential industry-wide 
reaction to stock split announcements.  Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1992), we find that when
the degree of homogeneity proxied by earnings correlation between splitting and non-
firms is high, non-splitting firms experience significant net contagion effects.  Non-split ing firms 
with high degree of asymmetric information captured by re n variance have a more positive 
stock price reaction than those firms where there is little or no asymmetric information.  In 
addition, we find that the degree of undervaluation proxied by book-to-market ratio matters; firms 
that are more likely to be und rvalued experience significant greater announcement period returns 
than those classified as overvalued firms.   
Further supporting evidence is provided by the results of cross-secti nal regressions where 
level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation 
significantly affect the magnitude of intra-industry announcement period reactions.  We also 
document an increase in earnings of non- plitting firms subsequent to stock split announcements 
and the earnings change is positively associated with stock price reactions of non-splitting firms.  
These findings suggest that investors react positively to non-splitting firms in anticipation of 
earnings increases following the announcement. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the contagion and 
competitive effects, the different industry and firm-specific factors that would affect non-splitti g 
firms and develops hypotheses relating to intra-industry reactions.  Section 3 describes data 
selection and matching process.  Section 4 analyzes the results and section 5 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.    
 
2. Intra-Industry Reactions of Stocks Split Announcements 
2.1. Contagion and Competitive Effects 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), McNichols and 
Dravid (1990) and Desai and Jain (1997) indicate that stock splits reveal favorable future 
information.  Prior literature also finds evidence that stock splits are followed by abnormal 
increases in dividends and/or earnings.  While a stock split results in an increase in stock price for 
the splitting firm, it might also reveal information about the industry in general.  The direction of 
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the industry stock price movement will depend on whether the information revealed has a et 
contagion or competitive effect on non-splitting firms. 
Foster (1981) and Szewczyk (1992) argue that because of homogeneity of firms within the 
industry, information released by a firm causes the market to reevaluate the value of both 
announcing and non-announcing firms in the same direction.  Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989) 
document that firms that announce stock splits are in industries that experience abnormally high 
earnings growth during the announcement year.  They suggest that the similarity of firms within 
the splitting firm industry is the reason for the unusual earnings increases across all firms in the 
industry on average.  Therefore, the positive information revealed by split announcements could 
generate a significant increase in share prices for splitting as well as non- plitting firms.  The 
positive reaction for non-splitting firms is called ‘contagion’ effect.  
However, stock splits may provide a negative impact on non-spli ting firms and cause their 
stock prices to fall.  This effect is more pronounced for industries with imperfect competition 
where the announcement of an event reveals comparative information about other firms in the 
industry.  For example, the performance of non-splitti g firms could be perceived as ‘poor’ 
relative to the superior performance of splitting firms.  At the extreme, wealth could be 
redistributed from non-splitting firms to the splitting firm.  Hence, a positive split signal of one 
firm may convey unfavorable information for other firms in the industry.  T is ega ive reaction is 
called ‘competitive’ effect.4  
The contagion and competitive effects are not mutually exclusive and thus the observed 
stock price reaction is the sum of these two effects.  Either a significant positive or negative 
reaction for non-splitting firms indicates that stock split announcements are not only firm-specific 
events but impact the industry as well.  A positive reaction suggests that non-splitting firms gain 
from stock split announcements of their industry counterparts implying a net contagion effect.  
Alternatively, a negative reaction for the non-splitting firms suggests that these firms experience a 
net competitive effect, i.e., the announcement of a stock split by an industry firm reveals an 
overall unfavorable information for non-splitting firms.  The finding of significant announcement 
returns for non-splitting firms suggests that stock splits are employed to reveal information as 
opposed to increasing trading liquidity.  Finally, if the stock price reaction is not significa t, o e 
                                                  
4 For more details, see Lang and Stulz (1992). 
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of the following three possibilities might explain the result.  First, stock split announcements may 
reveal only firm-specific information and thus not have an industry-w de effect.  Second, stock 
splits have an intra-industry effect but the positive (contagion) effects for some firms cancel the 
negative (competitive) effects for other firms in the industry resulting in an insignificant reaction.  
Third, the main motive for stock splits may not be to reveal information, but rather to increase 
liquidity by moving share prices into the ‘normal’ range.  
 
2.2. Industry and Firm-Specific Characteristics Influencing Intra-Industry Reactions 
 In this section we examine the impact of industry and firm-specific factors on the market’s 
perception of change in no -splitting firms’ equity value at the stock split announcement.  As 
stated earlier, unlike prior studies that examine intra-industry effects for events with strong 
current and future cash flow implications, this study tests the market’s inference of non-splitting 
firm’s stock value from an event that is purely accounting in nature.  Thus this study provides a 
uncontaminated setting to test of how the market incorporates these factors in pricing securities 
while reacting to a corporate event. 
  
2.2.1 Industry Reactions and Industry Characteristics 
Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that in highly concentrated industries where the competition 
for market share among firms is high, the competitive effect is more pronounced.  Thus a stock 
split announcement by a firm in highly concentrated industries is more likely to reveal unfavorable 
information about its competitors, causing a shift in the competitive balance within the industry.  
Therefore, relative to non-splitting firms in low concentrated industries, firms in h ghly
concentrated industries are expected to experience less positive returns from stock split 
announcements of their industry counterparts.  We would anticipate a negative relation between 
announcement period returns of non-splitting firms and the degree of concentration within the 
industry.   
 
2.2.2. Industry Reactions and Firm-Specific Factors  
(i) Degree of Similarity 
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Foster (1981), Lang and Stulz (1992), and Firth (1996) find that abnormal returns of non-
announcing firms whose characteristics are closely related to those of the announcing firms are 
larger than the abnormal returns of non-announcing firms whose characteristics are dissimilar.  
They argue that this result is consistent with greater intra-industry information transfer for firms 
with similar characteristics that are affected by common factors.  Their results would imply stock 
split announcements will affect non-splitti g firms with a high degree of similarity to splitting 
firms more than those with low degree of similarity.  This suggests a positiv  relation between 
abnormal returns of non-splitting firms and degree of similarity between splitting and non-splitti g 
firms.  
 
 (ii) Level of Asymmetric Information for Non-Splitting Firms 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find 
significantly higher stock price reactions at the announcement of stock splits for firms classified as 
having high level of information asymmetry relative to other splitting firms.  They conclude that 
for these firms, stock splits reveal more information.  If stock splits reveal industry-wide 
information, their findings will imply that non-splitting firms that have a high level of asymmetric 
information will experience a greater impact from the announcement than other firms in the
industry. This would predict a positive relation between abnormal returns for non-splitting 
industry firms and the degree of asymmetric information. 
 
(iii)  Degree of Underpricing for Non-Splitting Firms 
 Fama and French (1992) find that stocks with high book relative to their market value (i.e. 
value stocks) outperform those with low book relative to the market value (i.e. glamour stocks).  
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find evidence consistent with Fama and French (1992).  
They further show that earnings growth for value stocks are significantly higher than glamour 
stocks and argue that high (low) book-to-mar et ratio stocks are underpriced (overpriced).  If 
book-to-market is a measure of the degree of undervaluation and stock splits reveals information 
about the industry, undervalued firms would be affected more from the announcements than 
overvalued firms.  This suggests that returns of non-splitting firms will be positively related to 
book-to-market ratio. 
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3. Data Selection and Matching Process 
3.1. Data Selection 
 The sample used in this study is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) tape and is cross- eferenced with the Wall Street Journal Index.5 There are 4,497 stock 
distributions, i.e., stock splits and stock dividends announced during the period of 1986 to 1995.  
Following Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984), we delete stock distributions with split factor 
(defined as the number of additional shares per existing share) less than or equal to 0.25 (600 
observations).  Similar to Lang and Stulz (1992) we assign firms to an industry group on the 
primary four-digit SIC codes obtained from C pustat.  We exclude firms whose (a) four-digit 
SIC code is not available (452 observations), (b) SIC code begins with 49- and 6- (992 
observations) representing public utilities and financial institutions since these firms are regulated 
and thus their announcements convey little information (Asquith and Mullins (1986) and 
Szewczyk (1992)), and (c) shares are not traded on major exchanges (i. . AMEX, NASDAQ or 
NYSE, 65 observations).  
Foster (1980) argues that the amount of information is inversely related to the sequence of 
information releases.  Pilotte and Manuel (1996) examine firms that conduct multiple stock splits 
and find evidence consistent with Foster (1980), suggesting that the market reacts more positively 
to the first stock split than to subsequent announcements.  Therefore, to focus on stock splits that 
are expected to convey the greatest amount of industry-wide information, we exclude splits 
conducted less than one year from the previous stock split announced by a firm in the same 
industry (1,607 observations).6  Similar to Firth (1996) we eliminate 436 observations with 
contemporaneous announcements over the announcement period.  We also drop firms that do not 
have return information during the announcement period window and firms with no industry 
matches.  The final sample consists of 327 stock splits announced during 1986 to 1995.   
 
3.2. Matching Process 
                                                  
5 The split data is from CRSP tape distribution code 5523.  
6 Other studies relating to information transfers have also eliminated observations having low industry-wide 
information (Lang and Stulz (1992), Szewczyk (1992) and Firth (1996)).  We find that the announcement period 
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The non-splitting firms include all other firms (both active and research firms) listed on 
Compustat that satisfy the following criteria: 
1. They have the same four-digit SIC code as splitting firms. 
2. Their shares are traded on AMEX, NASDAQ or NYSE. 
3. A five-day announcement period return is available on CRSP. 
4. They do not announce stock splits within an eleven-day period centered around day 0 of the 
splitting firm announcement.7 
The last criterion ensures that stock splits announced by matching firms during the event 
window are not a possible cause for the significant results for these firms.  There are 3,684 non-
splitting firms in 199 different four-digit SIC codes.  The average (median) number of non-
splitting firms for each splitting firm is 11.26 (7) with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 66.   
Only 3 observations have more than 50 matching firms.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Abnormal Returns of Non-Splitting Firms 
Similar to Aharony and Swary (1996) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) we use 
five-day cumulative abnormal returns calculated from day -2 to +2 relative to the announcement 
day to measure the announcement period returns for both splitting and non-splitting firms.  The 
abnormal returns are defined as returns in excess of the value-weig ted market returns.8  Table 1 
presents the results of abnormal returns for both splitting and non-splitting firms. The splitting 
firms experience significant daily excess returns during the stock split announcement period.  
Consistent with Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) we document a significant average five-day 
cumulative announcement period of 3.82 percent.  This result confirms the conclusion of prior 
studies that stock splits are considered ‘good’ news thus resulting in an increase in equity value at 
the announcemnts. 
As stated earlier the effect of stock split announcements on non-splitting firms in the 
industry is the sum of two effects: (a) the contagion effect where shareholders of non-splitting 
                                                                                                                                                     
returns for non-splitting firms at the announcement of the sec nd split within an industry is lower relative to the 
first split. 
7 This process is similar to Firth (1996).  The results are robust to the window used.  
8 See Bar-Yosef and Brown (1977) and Brown and Warner (1985). 
  
 
9
firms benefit from favorable information conveyed by the announcem nts and (b) the competitive 
effect where split announcements reveal comparative unfavorable information for non-splitting 
firms in the industry causing stock prices of these firms to decline.  Observing a significant intra-
industry reaction suggests that information conveyed by the stock split announcement transfers to 
non-splitting firms within the same industry indicating that these announcements are associated 
with revealing industry-wide information rather than enhancing liquidity. 
To test the impact of stock splits on non-splitting firm we examine the abnormal returns 
for non-splitting firms around the split announcement date.  However, since the announcement 
period for a given split is the same for all non-splitting firms in an industry, there is a correl tion 
of returns problem that results in biased test statistics. To control for this 'clustering problem' we 
form an equally-weighted portfolio of all non-splitting firms in the same industry for each split.  
Thus the abnormal returns for non-splitting firms are portfolio abnormal returns as opposed to 
individual abnormal returns.  The results presented in table 1 suggest that over the announcement 
period window the mean five-day cumulative return for non-splitting firms is 0.34 percent, 
significant at the 10 percent level.9  The small but significantly positive abnormal announcement 
period returns suggests that an intra-i dustry reaction exists in the context of stock split 
announcements.  Since the announcement of a stock split does not impact the trading range of 
non-splitting firms’ stocks, the significant announcement period returns for these firms are 
consistent with the information content hypothesis that stock splits reveal information.  A positive 
reaction of non-splitting firms also indicates that favorable information conveyed by stock split an 
announcement has a net positive impact on non-splitting firms in the same industry.  These results 
support the finding of previous studies that the market reevaluates the value of announcing firms 
and that of non-announcing firms in the same direction (Foster (1981) and Szewczyk (1992)). 
 
4.2. Industry Reactions and Industry and Firm-Spec fic Characteristics 
4.2.1. Industry Reactions and Level of Concentration 
Lang and Stulz (1992) document that the competitive effect is more pronounced in highly 
concentrated industries where the competition among firms is high; stock splits announced by a 
                                                  
9 We eliminate an outlier where the abnorm l return exceeded 300 percent.  Inclusion of this observation does not 
significantly alter the results. 
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firm tend to reveal comparative information about non-splitting firms within the industry resulting 
in less positive r turns for these firms.  In this section, we test whether non-splitting firms in low 
concentrated industries benefit more from stock split announcements than those in highly 
concentrated industries.  Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and Yoon 
(1998), we use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the degree of concentration within an industry.  
We calculate HI by summing square market share of each firm relative to all other firms with the 
four-digit SIC code.  Market share is defined as the firm’s annual sales at the fiscal-year end prior 
to the stock split announcement as a percentage of industry sales.  A low (high) HI indicates a low 
(high) level of concentration and hence a low (high) degree of competition among firms. We 
follow the Antitrust Guidelines by the Department of Justice which uses Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) as a quantitative measurement of concentration level in defining highly concentrated 
industries.  The Department of Justice classifies an industry with HHI greater than 1,800 o be a 
highly concentrated industry.10 
Table 2 presents abnormal returns for the portfolio of non-splitting firms partitioned by 
Herfindahl index.  For low concentrated industries, stock prices of non-splitting firms increase 
significantly by 0.73 percent compared to 0.16 percent for non-splitti g firms in highly 
concentrated industries.  The test statistic for the difference in mean returns between firms in high 
and low concentrated industries is significant at the 10 percent level.  These results suggest that 
the level of concentration is an important determinant of the cross-sectional variation in 
announcement period returns for non-splitting firms; non-splitting firms in highly concentrated 
industries experience lower benefits from stock split announcements than those in low 
concentrated industries and is consistent with the findings of Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and 
Yoon (1998).  
 
4.2.2.  Industry Reactions and Similarity of Earnings 
 Foster (1981) and Lang and Stulz (1992) find evidence suggesting that the contagion 
effect is more pronounced for non-an uncing firms with high degree of similarity to announcing 
firms.  Foster (1981) reasons that an announcement of a firm conveys more information for non-
                                                  
10 HHI is calculated by summing over the largest 50 firms in the industry.  See Parkin 3rd edition.
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announcing firms that display similar characteristics to the announcing firm than for those whose 
characteristics are different.  Their findings predict that non-splitting firms with high degree of 
similarity to splitting firms gain more from stock split announcements of their industry 
counterparts than those with low degree of similarity.   
 Since Firth (1996) suggests that firms that are similar to each other have a high correlation 
of earnings we use earnings correlation as a measure of the degree of similarity between firms.  To 
eliminate the effects of capital structure and taxes, we compute earnings correlation of annual 
earnings before interest and taxes for ten years preceding the stock split announcement.  A non-
splitting firm is considered ‘highly similar’ (‘highly dissimilar’) to a splitting firm if their earnings 
correlation is greater than or equal to (less than) the sample median correlation of 0.20.  
Table 3, panel A, presents the results when non-splitti g firms are partitioned by degree of 
similarity.  We find that the mean abnormal returns for the sub-sample of non-splitting firms 
portfolios whose earnings correlation is less than the sample median (i.e., dissimil r firms) is –0.34 
percent.  For non-splitting firms portfolios that are ‘highly similar’ to the announcing firm there is 
an increase in stock price of 0.26 percent in stock.  Furthermore, the difference in mean abnormal 
returns between the two groups is significant at the 5 percent level.  These results indicate that 
stock split announcements reveal more information to non-splitting firms with high degree of 
similarity to the splitting firm and is consistent with the findings of Foster (1981) and Lang and 
Stulz (1992). 
 We also examine whether the results presented in panel A are affected by the industry 
level of concentration.  To test this hypothesis, the sample is divided into four cells based on the 
medians of Herfindahl index (proxying level of concentration) and earnings correlation (proxying 
degree of similarity).  Abnormal returns for each of the four cells is the average market-adjusted 
excess returns of equally-weighted portfolios grouped  by industry and event date. Prior results 
would suggest that firms that are classified as being similar (dissimilar) and in less (highly) 
concentrated industries would gain (lose) the most from the split announcement.   
The results are presented in panel B.  For firms in low concentrated industries with high 
degree of similarity to the splitting firm (group a) experience a stock price increase of 0.46 
percent, the highest of the four cells.  In contrast, the mean stock price of non-splitting firms in 
highly concentrated industries whose earnings correlation is low (group b) declines by a 
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significant 0.65 percent.  Furthermore the test statistic for the difference in mean returns between 
these two groups is also significant at the 1 percent level.  In addition, the pattern of difference 
among sub-samples support earlier conclusions that both level of concentration and degree of 
similarity are significant variables in determining the reaction of non-splitting firms.  For high 
concentrated industries, the abnormal return for non-splitting firms that are similar to the splitting 
firm is statistically higher than that for dissimilar non-splitting firms.  For low concentrated 
industries the difference in mean returns between high and low earnings correlation, although 
correct in direction, is not statistically significant.  Similarly, controlling for the degree of 
similarity, we find that markets react more positively to non-sp itting firms in less concentrated 
industries than those in highly concentrated industries and this effect is most pronounced for 
dissimilar firms.  
 
4.2.3. Industry Reactions and Level of Asymmetric Information
 Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) suggest 
that the market reacts more strongly to stock split announcements of firms that have high 
asymmetric information level because the announcements reveal more information.  Consequently, 
it is hypothesized that intra-industry reaction to a stock split announcement will convey more 
information for non-splitting firms who have high level of asymmetric information.  Since stock 
splits convey positive information for non-splitting firms, this would imply that shareholders of 
non-spliting firms with high level of information asymmetry gain significantly more than firms 
who have low asymmetric information.   
The level of asymmetric information is measured by return variance (RVAR) defined as 
the variance of CRSP value-weighted market-adjusted return computed for the year preceding 
stock split announcements.  Dierkens (1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) suggest 
that volatility in residual stock returns captures the degree of information asymmetry.11  Firm  
with RVAR greater than or equal to the median sample firm are classified as firms with high level 
of asymmetric information.  Alternatively we classify firms as having low asymmetric information 
if RVAR is less than the sample median.  
                                                  
11 Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) report that the correlation between volatility in residual stock returns 
and other measures of information asymmetry (e.g., analysts’ earnings forecast error, volatility in abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements etc.) is greater than 0.4.
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In panel A of table 4 we present results for two groups of non-splitting firms classified by 
RVAR.  For the sub-sample of firms where the level of information asymmetry is high, the equity 
value of non-splitting firms increases by 1.32 percent (significant at 1 percent level) on average.  
For non-splitting firms with low asymmetric information level, there is a statistically insignificant 
decrease in stock price of 0.08 percent.  The t-s atistic for the difference in mean returns between 
high and low asymmetric information level sub-samples is significant at 5 percent level.  These 
findings support the hypothesis that firms with high level of asymmetric information gain 
significantly more from the stock split announcement than those with low information asymmetry. 
 We also test whether the results rported in Panel A persist after controlling for industry 
level of concentration.  To test this hypothesis, we classify the sample into four cells by the level 
of information asymmetry (RVAR) and the industry level of concentration (HI).  Results are 
presented in panel B of Table 4.  As predicted, the mean return is highest (1.63 percent) for firms 
with a high degree of information asymmetry in low concentrated industries (group a).  For firms 
with low level of information asymmetry and in highly concentrated i dust ies (group b), the 
average change in equity value is –0.20 percent.  The t-sta istic for the difference in mean returns 
between these two groups is highly significant.  Consistent with earlier univariate results, we find 
that both concentration level and asymmetric information level are significant determinants of 
intra-industry reactions.  Controlling for the level of industry concentration, we find that firms 
with high level of asymmetric information experience higher returns than firms with low level of 
asymmetric information.  Similarly, controlling for the level of information asymmetry, we find 
that firms in highly concentrated industries experience lower returns than those in less 
concentrated industries although the differences are statistically weak.  
 
4.2.4. Industry Reactions and Degree of Undervaluation 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) 
suggest that book-t -market (B/M) ratio is a proxy for degree of undervaluation.  They argue that 
firms that have high B/M ratio are more likely to be undervalued.  Having documented that stock 
splits reveal significant amount of intra-industry information, we hypothesize that industry firms 
that are most likely to be undervalued (overvalued) will experience a greater (smaller) change in 
stock prices at the stock split announcement of their industry counterpart. 
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We test this hypothesis by dividing firms based on the degree of undervaluation and 
compare the returns between the sub-samples of firms that are most likely to be overvalued and 
undervalued.   Consistent with Lakonishok, et al. (1994) and Ikenberry, et al.(1996) we use B/M 
ratio to proxy the degree of undervaluation.  B/M is defined as the book value of assets divided by 
the book value of assets plus the difference between market and book value of equity as of the 
year-end prior to the split announcement.12  Firms are classified as undervalued (overvalued) if the 
B/M ratio exceeds or equals (less than) the sample median.13 
The results are provided in Table 5.  We find that firms that are most likely to be 
undervalued experience a significant (10 percent level) increase in stock prices of 0.45 percent at 
the announcement of the stock split.  For firms that have a low B/M ratio, the announcement 
period return is negative but insignificantly different from 0.  The difference in mean returns 
between the two groups is significant indicating that the degree of undervaluation is important in 
explaining the variation in announcement period variations of non-splitting industry firms.  We 
also test whether these results hold after controlling for industry characteristics by dividing the 
sample into four cells by Herfindahl index (HI) and B/M ratio.  The results are presented in Table 
5, panel B.  Non-splitting firms in the sub-sample where B/M ratio exceeds or equals to the 
sample median and HI is less than the sample median experience the greatest abnormal returns of 
1.14 percent.  On the other hand, non-splitting firms with low B/M ratio in highly concentrated 
industries earn the lowest abnormal returns of –0.57 percent.  The difference in mean returns 
between these two sub-samples is statistically significant (1 percent level).  These results also 
suggest that B/M ratio and HI are significant determinants in explainig the stock price reactions 
of non-splitting firms. 
 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
To confirm earlier univariate results we regress five-day cumulative returns of non-
splitting firms on the level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of information asymmetry, 
and degree of undervaluation.  In addition, we use five-day cumulative market-adjusted return of 
splitting firms and split factor as additional explanatory variables.  Firth (1996) suggests that there 
                                                  
12 The similar results are obtained when B/M is defined as book relative to market value of equity.
13 We obtain stronger results if we use B/M ratio of 1 to classify over and undervalued firms.  
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is association between returns of announcing and non-announcing firms.  McNichols and Dravid 
(1990) report the positive relationship between split factor and level of information revealed by 
splitting firms. We run two sets of regressions; one with individual firms and the other with non-
splitting firms grouped into equally-weighted portfolios by industry for each split.  In Table 6 we 
present regression results for individual firms only; the results for portfolios (327 observations) 
are similar and hence not reported.      
In models 1-2, we test whetr the level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of 
information asymmetry, and degree of undervaluation affect announcement period returns of the 
non-splitting firms. Consistent with the univariate analysis presented earlier we find significantly 
positive coefficients for earnings correlation, return variance, and book-to-m rket ratio and a 
significantly negatively coefficient for Herfindahl index.  These results suggest that non-splitting 
firms in low concentrated industries and those that are similar to splitting firms gain significantly 
from stock split announcements.  Similarly non-sp itting firms that have high level of asymmetric 
information and those that are undervalued also experience higher returns from the 
announcements.  Further, returns of non-splitting firms are positively related to those of splitting 
firms but the slope coefficient is not significant.  These findings provide strong supportive 
evidence that the industry characteristics (level of concentration) and firm-specific factors (degree 
of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation) explain the cross-sectional 
variation in returns for non-splitting firms at the announcements of stock splits. 
In models 3-4 we further investigate the magnitude of information transfer by regressing 
non-splitting firms abnormal returns against the four factors interacted with the splitting firm’s 
announcement period return.  Consistent with the results presented earlier we find that level of 
concentration, degree of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation are 
significant explanators of the degree of information transfer.  We also find that stock splits by 
large firms transfer more information; the coefficient is positive and highly significant. 
 
4.4. Change in Earnings Subsequent to Stock Split Announcements 
  The results presented thus far suggest that stock split announcements reveal industry-wide 
information; non-splitting firms in the same industry experience positive returns at the split 
announcement period.  The effect is most pronounced for firms (a) that are in less concentrated 
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industries (b) that are similar to splitting firms (c) that have high level of information asymmetry 
(d) or that are undervalued.  In this section we test whether there is a relation b tween investors’ 
revision in non-splitting firms’ value and subsequent operating performance. 
  Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) find that stock split announcements convey favorable 
information about future earnings changes.  Similarly, McNichols and Dravid (1990) find a 
positive relation between announcement period returns and subsequent earnings increases for 
splitting firms.  These results coupled with the evidence presented earlier that stock splits reveal 
favorable industry-wide information predict an increase in earnings performance for non-splitting 
firms subsequent to the announcements.  Further, if investors react to non- plitting firms 
anticipating an increase in future earnings, abnormal returns of non-splitting firms should be 
positively associated with subsequent earnings change.   
  To test this hypothesis, we examine the change in earnings for both short- and  long-run.  
Short- (long-) run earnings change is defined as the change in earnings from a year (three years) 
subsequent to a ye r prior to the announcement.  We use two earnings measures; earning-per-
share (net income available to shareholders per share) standardized by share price at the year-end 
prior to the announcement and operating earnings defined as earnings before interest and taxes 
standardized by book value of total assets at the year-end prior to the announcement.  Consistent 
with the abnormal return results, we group non-splitti g firms into equally-weighted portfolios by 
industry for each split announcement.  
 Table 7 presents evidence of portfolio earnings changes for the non-split ing firms.  In 
panel A we observe that non-splitting firms experience a significant increase in earnings 
subsequent to stock split announcements.  The mean short- (long-) run increase in earnings-per-
share is 3.35 (8.00) percent and highly significant.   Similarly, there is an increase in earnings 
before interest and taxes of 1.73 (4.89) percent in the short- (long-) run.  These findings support 
the hypothesis that stock split announcements reveal favorable information about industry-wi e 
earning changes for both the short- and the long-run. 
 Panel B presents results for the test of the relation between the investors’ revision in non-
splitting firm value at the announcement of the stock split and future earnings performance of 
these firms.  The dependent variable is the five-day abnormal returns for non-splitting firms and 
the independent variables are the short- and l ng-run changes in earnings-per- hare and earnings 
  
 
17
before interest and taxes.  As hypothesized, there is an association between returns of non-
splitting firms and increases in earnings subsequent to stock split announcements.  The coefficient 
for the short- (long-) run earnings-per-share change and returns is 0.04 (0.01), significant at 1 (5) 
percent.  For the earnings before interest and taxes measure, we find a significant coefficient for 
the long-run earnings change only.  In the short-run the coefficient is positive (correct direction) 
but statistically weak.  Overall the results presented in Table 7 suggest that non-spli ting firms in 
the same industry as splitting firms experience a significant improvement in short- and long-run 
earnings performance subsequent to the stock split announcement of their industry counterpart.  
Furthermore investors, anticipating an improvement in future operating performance of the 
industry, react positively to non-splitting firms during the split announcement period.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 This paper examines whether stock split announcements affect stocks prices of non-
splitting firms in the same industry.  The results indicate that shareholders of non-splitting firms 
experience a significant 0.34 percent increase in equity value during the stock split announcement 
period of their industry counterparts.  This finding coupled with the positive abnormal returns of 
splitting firms suggests that the favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements 
transfers to non-splitting firms within the same industry.  The existence of intra-i dustry reaction 
is also consistent with the information content (as opposed to the trading range) hypothesis. 
 Further, non-splitting firms in low concentrated industries measured by Herfindahl index 
gain more from split announcements than those in highly concentrated industries.  This finding 
suggests that the positive reaction of non-splitting firms is more pronounced in low concentrated 
industries.  In addition, non-splitting firms whose degree of similarity to splitting firms measured 
by earnings correlation is high experience significantly higher stock returns than those with low 
degree of similarity.  This result is consistent with Firth (1996) that the announcements convey 
more favorable information for non-an uncing firms whose earnings are highly correlated to 
splitting firms.  
Non-splitting firms with high asymmetric information measured by return variance also 
earn significantly higher abnormal returns than those with low asymmetric information.  This 
indicates that the higher the information asymmetry level, the greater the positive intra-industry 
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reaction.  In addition, the mean equity value of non-splitting firms with high book-t -market ratio 
is significantly higher than that of non-splitti g firms with low book-t -market ratio.  This finding 
suggests that firms with high book relative to market value are undervalued and thus benefit from 
the announcements more than those with low book relative to market value. 
 In addition, the regression results indicate that abnormal returns of non-splitti g firms are 
negatively related to Herfindahl index and positively related to earnings correlation, return 
variance and book-t -market ratio.  The slope coefficients of these factors are significant even 
after controlling for other factors.  Finally we find an improvement in earnings performance for 
non-splitting firms both in the short- and the long-run and the announcement period returns for 
these firms are positively related to the earnings changes.  We conclude that stock split conveys 
favorable industry-wide information about earnings improvement and industry characteristics and 
firm-specific factors are significant determinants in explaining these stock price reactions. 
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Table 1 
Abnormal Returns for Splitting and Non-Splitting Firms at the Announcements of Stock 
Splits 
 
This table presents mean abnormal returns for 327 firms that announce stock splits and portfolios 
of 3,684 non-splitting firms.  Abnormal returns are value-weighted market-adjusted returns.  The 
non-splitting firms are firms listed on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC code as 
splitting firms, whose shares are traded on major exchanges and do not announce stock splits 
during an eleven-day period centered around stock split announcement day (day 0).  The 
portfolios of non-splitting firms are equally weighted grouped for each event.  ***,**, and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
  
   
 Splitting Firms Non-Splitting Firms 
(Period)       
 N Mean t-statistic N Mean t-statistic 
  (%)   (%)  
       
       
(-20,-3) 327 7.08 9.80*** 327 1.29 2.80*** 
       
       
(-2,+2) 327 3.82 9.26*** 327 0.34 1.75* 
       
       
(+3,+20) 327 2.73 4.82*** 327 -0.22 -0.56 
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Table 2  
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by Level of 
Concentration 
 
This table presents mean five-day cumulative value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-
splitting firms classified by level of concentration.  Level of concentration is measured by 
Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC 
code.  The market share is firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as 
a percentage of industry sales.  The non-splitting firms are grouped into equally weighted 
portfolios of all firms in the same industry as the splitting firm for each stock split.  The t-statistic 
and the numbers of portfoli s are in parenthesis and square brackets respectively.  The last row 
presents the t-statistic for the statistical difference in mean between the two sub-samples. ***,**, 
and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
HI 
 
Abnormal Returns 
 
  0.73 
 £ 1,800 (2.14**) 
 [102] 
  
 0.16 
 > 1,800 (0.59) 
 [225] 
  
t-statistic 1.71* 
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Table 3 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by  
Degree of Similarity and Level of Concentration 
This table presents mean five-day value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-splitting firms 
classified by degree of similarity.  Earnings correlation (CORR) is the correlation of earnings 
before interest and taxes for a ten-year period preceding the announcement and is a measure of 
degree of similarity between splitting and non-splitti g firms.  Level of concentration is measured 
by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at 
the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the 
four-digit SIC code.  Non-splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios for each 
industry for each event.  The t-statistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of portfolios are in 
square brackets.  The test statistic for difference in mean returns between two sub-sampl s is in
the last row. The t-statistic at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the difference in mean 
returns between sub-samples a (i.e., firms that are similar and in less concentrated industries) and b 
(i.e., firms that are dissimilar and in highly concentrated industries).  ***,**, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Similarity of Earnings 
CORR 
 
Abnormal Returns 
 
 -0.34 
£ Median (-1.52) 
 [271] 
 
 0.26 
> Median (1.25) 
 [283] 
  
t-statistic -1.96** 
 
Panel B: Similarity of Earnings and Level of Concentration 
 CORR  
    
HI > Median £ Median t-statistic 
    
 0.46a 0.23 0.54 
 £ 1,800 (1.58) (0.77)  
 [93] [96]  
    
 0.17 -0.65b 2.00** 
 > 1,800 (0.60) (-2.17**)  
 [190] [175]  
    
t-statistic 0.72 2.08** 2.65*** 
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 Table 4 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by 
Level of Asymmetric Information and Level of Concentration 
This table presents mean five-day cumulative value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-
splitting firms classified by level of asymmetric information. Information asymmetry is measured 
by the return variance (RVAR) of market-adjusted returns in the year preceding the stock split 
announcement day.  Level of concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum 
of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Non-
splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios for each industry for each event.  The 
t-statistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of portfolios are in square brackets.  The test 
statistic for difference in mean returns between two sub-samples is in the last row. The t-statistic 
at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the difference in mean returns between sub-
samples a (i.e., firms with high levels of asymmetric information and in less concentrated 
industries) and b (i.e., firms with low levels of asymmetric information and in highly concentrated 
industries).  ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Degree of Asymmetric Information 
RVAR Abnormal Returns 
 
 -0.08 
£ Median (-0.33) 
 [270] 
 
 1.32 
> Median (2.53***) 
 [238] 
  
t-statistic -2.43*** 
 
Panel B: Level of Concentration and Degree of Asymmetric Information 
 RVAR  
    
HI > Median £ Median t-statistic 
    
  1.63 a 0.15 1.76* 
 £ 1,800 (2.06**) (0.51)  
 [89] [92]  
    
 1.13 -0.20 b 1.73* 
 > 1,800 (1.65*) (-0.58)  
 [149] [178]  
    
t-statistic 0.48 0.78 2.13** 
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Table 5 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by  
Degree of Undervaluation and Level of Concentration 
This table presents mean five-day value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-splitting firms 
classified by book-to-market (B/M) ratio.  B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to book value 
of asset plus the difference between market and book value of equity. Level of concentration is 
measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s 
annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of 
each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Non-splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted 
portfolios for each industry for each event.  The t-s atistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of 
portfolios are in square brackets.  The test statistic for difference in mean returns between two 
sub-samples is in the last row. The t-statis ic at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the 
difference in mean returns between sub-samples a (i.e., firms that are undervalued and in less 
concentrated industrie ) and b (i.e., firms that are undervalued and in highly concentrated 
industries).  ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Degree of Undervaluation 
B/M 
 
Abnormal Returns 
 
 -0.31 
£ Median (-0.98) 
 [289] 
 
 0.45 
> Median (1.73*) 
 [299] 
  
t-statistic -1.85* 
 
Panel B: Level of Concentration and Degree of Undervaluation  
 B/M  
    
HI > Median £ Median t-statistic 
    
  1.14a 0.21 1.74* 
 £ 1,800 (2.56***) (0.68)  
 [102] [95]  
    
 0.10 -0.57 b 1.21 
 > 1,800 (0.31) (-1.26)  
 [197] [194]  
    
t-statistic 1.90** 1.43 2.70*** 
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Table 6 
Regression Results 
 
This table presents multivariate regression results.  The dependent variable is five-day stock split 
announcement value-weighted market-adjusted returns for 3,684 non-splitting firms.  The non-
splitting firms include firms on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC code as splitting 
firms, whose shares are traded on major exchanges and do not announce stock splits during an 
eleven-day period centered around stock split announcement day. Herfindahl Index (HI) is the 
sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the four-digit SIC code.   
Earnings correlation (CORR) is a measure of similarity between splitting and non-spl tting firms 
and is the correlation of earnings before interest and taxes for a ten-year period preceding the 
announcement.  Information asymmetry is measured by variance of daily market-adjusted returns 
(RVAR) in the year preceding stock split announcement day.  Book- o-market (B/M) is measured 
as the ratio of the book value of assets to (book value of assets – bo k value of equity + market 
value of equity).  Size dummy (SIZE) takes a value of 1 if splitting firm’s market value of equity 
is greater than the industry median and 0 otherwise.  The cumulative market-adjusted returns 
(ARS) of splitting firms is defined as the returns in excess of the value-weig ted market index.  
Split factor (SF) obtained from CRSP and is the number of additional shares per existing share.  
All values except returns and split factor are obtained from Compustat and are numbers at the 
fiscal year-end preceding stock split announcement.  ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 
10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Variables Expected Model Model Model Model 
 Sign 1 2 3 4 
Intercept  4.66 5.17 0.64 0.65 
  (1.94**) 
 
(2.14**) (1.38) (1.41) 
HI - -0.81 -0.88   
  (-2.60***) 
 
(-2.83***)   
CORR + 0.57 0.56   
  (1.66*) 
 
(1.65*)   
RVAR + 0.04 0.04   
  (5.64***) 
 
(5.62***)   
B/M + 1.70 1.71   
  (2.57***) 
 
(2.59***)   
HI x ARS -   -0.06 -0.03 
    (-1.63*) 
 
(-3.15***) 
CORR x ARS +   0.10 0.09 
    (2.20**) 
 
(2.05**) 
RVAR x ARS (x 10-2) +   0.24 0.24 
    (3.82***) 
 
(3.95***) 
B/M x ARS +   0.15 0.18 
    (1.68*) 
 
(2.12**) 
SIZE x ARS +  0.09  0.12 
   (2.04**) 
 
 (2.03**) 
ARS + 0.03  0.34  
  (0.80) 
 
 (1.09)  
SPF + -0.18 -0.23 -0.08 -0.13 
  (-0.39) 
 
(-0.48) (-0.18) (-0.27) 
Adjusted R2 (%)  1.48 1.60 0.70 0.80 
p-value of F-statistic  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7  
Earnings Changes Subsequent to Stock Split Announcements 
 
This table presents earnings change of non-splitting firms subsequent to the stock split 
announcement year.  Earnings change for short- un (s) and long-run (l) are the change in earnings 
from year +1 to year –1 and year +1 to year –1 respectively relative to the announcement year.  
Earnings are measured as either earnings per share (EPS) standardized by closing stock price a 
year prior to the announcement or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) standardized by year 
–1 book value of total assets.  All earnings values are presented in the multiple of 100.  The non-
splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios by industry for each split.  N is the 
numbers of portfolios having earnings available from Compustat.  In Panel B, the dependent 
variable is five-day market-adjusted returns of non-splitting firms.  The t-statistics are in 
parenthesis.  ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Level of Earnings Changes 
Earnings Changes: N Mean t-statistic 
    
Short-run:    
DEPSS 326 3.35 6.28*** 
DEBITS 322 1.73 5.29*** 
    
Long-run:    
DEPSL 274 8.00 8.67*** 
DEBITL 273 4.89 6.06*** 
    
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
Variables Expected 
Sign 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Intercept  0.13 0.22 0.50*** 0.37** 
  (0.94) 
 
(1.25) (2.55) (2.06) 
DEPSS + 0.04***    
  (5.40)    
DEPSL +  0.01**   
   (2.28)   
DEBITS +   0.02  
    (1.30)  
DEBITL +    0.01* 
     (1.68) 
      
Adjusted R2 (%)  0.91 0.20 0.02 0.07 
p-value for F-statistic  0.00 0.02 0.20 0.10 
 
